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Abstract 
This article examines the changing agendas on smoking-related issues in Scotland.  It 
charts the methods that groups, governments and MSPs use to frame and pursue or 
suppress discussion of the prohibition of smoking in public places.  The article presents 
two narratives– one which stresses ‘new politics’ and the ability of groups to influence 
policy through Scottish Parliamentary procedures, and another which stresses Scottish 
Executive ‘business as usual’ and presents smoking legislation as a logical progression 
from early ministerial commitments.  A combination of narratives suggests that tobacco 
legislation in Scotland was by no means part of an inevitable international trend towards 
prohibition and this article traces the precise conditions or ‘policy windows’  in which 
decisions take place. The discussion highlights the often unsettled nature of the 
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By 2006 all four countries in the UK had decided to legislate to ban smoking in public 
places.  This, combined with measures on tobacco advertising, smoking cessation and 
health education, makes the UK one of the most progressive member states in the EU on 
tobacco policy (see Joosens, 2004).  It also substantiates a long-term global trend towards 
tobacco prohibition in the developed world (Studlar, 2004).  However, the picture has not 
been one of clear-cut and effortless policy change.  The evidence from post-devolution 
Scotland in particular suggests that there was by no means an inevitable progression 
towards comprehensive tobacco prohibition.  When the decision to legislate was made 
official in Scotland at the end of 2004, a complete ban went against the government 
position in England (a case made forcefully by then Secretary of State for Health John 
Reid).
1
   The legislation was set to mark one of the most significant policy divergences 
between Scotland and England since devolution.  It was one of the Scottish Executive’s 
‘flagship’ policies and, to this day, First Minister Jack McConnell calls it the most 
important achievement in his term of office.  Yet, as recently as January 2004, he voiced 
public opposition to comprehensive legislation.  In this light - of opposition from the UK 
health minister and ministerial equivocation within Scotland - tobacco policy change in 
Scotland is significant.  We have witnessed policy change not only in terms of a break 
from the voluntary tobacco agreements of the past, but also a break from the policy of the 
UK government and a change of stated policy position by the Scottish Executive. So how 
do we explain this policy change? 
 
Political science has long been dominated by theories which explain why policy does not 
change.  For example, incrementalism points to the limits of rational comprehensive 
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decision making and a policy process which undermines radical policy shifts.  Similarly, 
policy networks analysis focuses on close group-government relations which foster long-
term consensus and attempt to minimise external interest in policy issues.  Of course, 
problems arise when policy appears to change significantly and a lack of dynamic 
elements may be held responsible for the decreasing popularity of policy networks 
analysis.  One notable exception is an attempt to combine theories of change and agenda 
setting with theories of stability and policy monopoly.  The term ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ describes lengthy periods of relative stability punctuated by the reframing of 
issues and brief but intense periods of policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  
This approach is relevant to tobacco policy which appeared reasonably stable in the UK 
and therefore constrained in Scotland.  The case study of smoking in public places 
demonstrates the importance of issue framing as well as venue shift in a continually 
evolving devolution ‘settlement’.  As Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 32) suggest: 
 
Policy venues are the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are 
made concerning a given issue.  Policymaking authority is not automatically 
assigned to particular venues … Just as images may change over time, so may 
[issues] fall within several venues. 
 
In the case of smoking policy and devolution in Scotland, successful attempts to reframe, 
or shape the policy image, of an issue caused a shift in the policy venue.  This can be 
seen in two main ways: 
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1. A shift of the policy venue considering a smoking ban from the UK to the 
Scottish arena; caused by 
2. A shift of group attention from the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Parliament. 
 
Successful reframing causes venue shift and the scope for legislating in a devolved 
Scottish Parliament appears to grow.  In this case, the process of changing the policy 
image is inextricably linked with venue shift, since it is now framed as a devolved rather 
than a reserved issue.  However, the extent of this shift is open to debate and two distinct 
‘narratives’ can be inferred from official reports and interviews conducted with groups, 
ministers and MSPs from 2003-6.
2
  The first argues that smoking policy was established 
and accepted by the Scottish Executive as a reserved issue following devolution (in part 
to limit the potential for debate).  However, a successful shift of group attention to the 
Scottish Parliament as a venue for change, coupled with the agenda-setting effects of 
Scottish Parliament legislative initiation, ‘forced the hands’ of Scottish Executive 
ministers in 2004.  This shifted consideration of the issue from the UK to Scotland as the 
issue was reframed as a public health and therefore devolved issue.  The venue shift 
allowed comprehensive policy change in Scotland which contrasted (at the time) with the 
UK reliance on voluntary agreements.   
 
We can compare this with a second account which undermines the significance of this 
shift.  The agenda on smoking has changed over a longer period and governmental 
positions in the UK and Scotland are fluid rather than fixed.  While the Scottish 
Executive was committed from 2000 to a voluntary agreement in the UK mould, this is 
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explained by similar policy conditions rather than reserved constraints and the need to 
avoid political embarrassment.  The Scottish Executive introduced the voluntary 
arrangement in the leisure industry as part of a series of smoking cessation measures and 
stated that this approach was a stepping stone to legislative change if the agreement was 
unsuccessful.  The decision to legislate in 2004 was therefore a logical progression of the 
original Scottish Executive policy.   
 
The focus on two narratives reflects the competing accounts of policy makers and 
pressure participants in the course of interview.   However, there are a number of other 
causal factors which are common to both accounts – policy learning from the experience 
of Ireland, shifting public opinion, media opinion sympathetic to policy change and the 
policy stances of the major parties.  This article therefore combines both narratives and 
draws on these shared elements to construct a ‘third way’ narrative of policy change in 
Scotland.  The conclusion considers the extent to which lessons from the case study of 
tobacco are applicable to wider political science debates. 
 
The Venue Shift Narrative: Limits to Policy Change and the UK Context 
 
In many ways it is easier to explain why policy would not change in Scotland.  The UK 
position was that a voluntary agreement with the leisure industry and an Approved Code 
of Practice on smoking in the workplace was the best means to address the issue of 
smoking in public places (see Cm 4177, 1998; Read, 2005).  This had an overarching 
influence on the scope for change in Scotland, given what we know about the power 
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relationships which have developed since devolution.  First, the UK government has a 
strong influence over the Scottish Executive, through the Treasury, party and civil service 
links.  Scottish divergence is either unlikely given their shared aims, or undermined by 
the need to avoid political embarrassment or repercussions. For example, the decision to 
take a separate line on free personal care for the elderly was met with Treasury 
inflexibility over Attendance Allowance payments, while Hepatitis C compensation was 
delayed in Scotland  because of a Whitehall challenge on the basis of devolved 
competence (Cairney, 2004; Keating, 2005; Keating et al, 2003; Lodge, 2003; McMahon, 
2002; Simeon, 2003).  Second, the Scottish Executive enjoys an ‘old-Westminster’ style 
relationship with the Scottish Parliament and the Labour and Liberal Democrat  coalition 
in Scotland whips as effectively as a majority government in Westminster (Arter, 2004a; 
2004b; Cairney, 2006a).  Third, groups in Scotland talk about increased and better access, 
but also cosmetic consultation and a lack of translation of access into influence, 
especially when the Scottish Executive has stated its position. 
 
Therefore, any change in a stated Scottish Executive position (with a UK basis) is 
surprising.  This explains the importance of venue shift – if groups are frustrated by a 
fixed position in one decision-making venue then it is in their interests to foster a shift to 
a venue with a more sympathetic audience.  This is made possible by the power of the 
Scottish Parliament to set the policy agenda and force the hand of the Scottish 
Executive.
3




Two ‘New Politics’ Explanations?  
 
New politics is a reference to the development of a Scottish political system designed in 
contrast to ‘old Westminster’.  This includes the strengthening of committees within 
parliament and a focus on government by consensus (see McGarvey, 2001; Mitchell, 
2001; Arter, 2004b; Keating, 2005; Shephard and Cairney, 2005; Cairney, 2006a).  In this 
light we can examine two Scottish differences as a means to explain policy initiation.  
The first is increased group influence in more than one venue.  While the effect of 
devolution is often exaggerated, groups generally report an increased willingness of the 
Scottish Executive and Parliament to maintain regular and frequent links.  This may be 
associated with a lack of policy capacity in Scotland.  Decision-makers did not have the 
expertise and research base to initiate policy in the early years of devolution, and so were 
reliant on groups (and local government) to make up this shortfall.  There is also evidence 
of a stronger role for public sector professionals in Scotland, as well as a greater 
concentration of medical and Royal College influence in Scotland (Keating, 2005; Greer, 
2004).  As a result, strong links are apparent between groups and the Executive, while 
groups have the ability to ‘hedge their bets’ (see HC 518-iii, 1988) with a Scottish 
Parliament equipped with more powers than Westminster (and most West European 
legislatures – see Arter, 2004a; 2004b; Cairney, 2006a).    
 
Second, there is increased scope for agenda-setting in the Scottish Parliament through the 
powers that committees enjoy, as well as the increased scope for non-executive bills.  In 
Westminster there are 3 main ways in which to pursue a Private Members’ Bill, with the 
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highest chance of success granted for those backbench MPs whose names appear near the 
top of a ballot held within 2 weeks of the commencement of each parliamentary session 
(Convery, 2000).  MPs assume their bills will fail without government support and may 
not decide which Bill to pursue until they are sure that they are high enough on the list.  
They may put their name forward with more intention to trade the parliamentary space or 
introduce Members’ Bills as a form of pressure – to highlight an issue or to encourage the 
government to introduce its own bill.  
 
In Scotland the process is more straightforward and non-executive legislation (members’, 
committee and private bills) accounts for a relatively high proportion of the total (11 of 
61 Bills from 1999-2003).   An MSP with agenda setting motives has a better chance of 
public debate and attention.  The MSP registers a proposed Bill with the Clerk and it is 
published in the Business Bulletin.  S/he then has one month to gather the support of at 
least 18 other MSPs.
4
  If this support is demonstrated the Bill is subject to committee 
investigation and then plenary debate.  In the case of tobacco advertising, this allowed 
opposition MSPs to put pressure on the UK government to reintroduce legislation which 
fell after the dissolution of Parliament in 2001.  This was a relatively simple process, 
since the issue was not of policy but of legislative time and inclination (the bill had 
already been introduced in Westminster and legislation was needed to fulfil EU 
requirements – see Read, 2005).  Therefore, when the bill was introduced in Scotland it 
was difficult for the Scottish Executive or UK government to discourage Scottish 
legislation on policy grounds.  The Scottish agenda on smoking in public places also 
spurred on the UK’s white paper Choosing Health (Cm 6374, 2004), while the timing of 
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the introduction of a smoking ban in Scotland was used by MPs and public health groups 
in the UK to embarrass the UK government and press for a free vote (Cairney, 2006c).  
However, the difference is that the Scottish bill on public places did not have a UK 
counterpart at that time, while the policy debate was less settled and there was still 
competition surrounding the framing of the issue. 
 
Venue Shift and Framing as a Reserved and a Devolved Issue 
 
International experience of tobacco policy framing shows that the Scottish experience is 
not unique.  For example, we see a shift in issues of causality.  In the early post-war 
period this reflected an association between active smoking and lung cancer.  More 
recently, this attention has shifted to the carcinogenic effects of passive smoking, as well 
as the effectiveness of ventilation in public places.  The identification of cause influences 
debates over the means to categorise the smoking issue.  For most of the 20
th
 century in 
the UK the significance of tobacco to the economy and the rights of the individual to 
smoke took precedence over health issues particularly before the evidence on passive 
smoking was linked to health and safety (Cairney, 2006c). Policy can also be framed in 
terms of comparisons and policy learning across countries.  While the Irish comparison 
has been so significant in Scotland (see below), it took action after New York, California, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Sweden (see http://www.globalink.org/tccp; 




However, the added element in this case is competition surrounding the framing of the 
devolution settlement and Scottish Parliament competence.  An unanticipated 
consequence of devolution is the often fluid boundary between reserved and devolved 
issues.  When there is a drive to reframe policy issues there is scope for MSPs to push the 
boundaries of Scottish Parliamentary competence (a process also apparent in the 
European Parliament – see Hix, 2002). 
 
The initial framing of smoking in public places as a reserved issue arises from the basis 
of its prohibition.  In Ireland the smoking ban was based on health and safety and 
employment law, with the agenda driven by an emphasis on bar workers.  Similar debates 
dominated the run up to the free vote in Westminster, with the initial food/ non-food 
distinction criticised because it protected the rights of restaurant but not bar workers.  
However, in Scotland there was clear reticence to use these arguments since the basis of 
legislation would impinge on reserved territory.  As the concordat between the Health 
and Safety executive and the Scottish Executive suggests, ‘The regulation of smoking 
and passive smoking in work places is a reserved matter’ 
(http://www.Scotland.gov.uk/concordats /hse-00.asp; see also Scottish Executive 2004a: 
26).  Further, groups such as the British Medical Association in Scotland expressed 
frustration that civil servants within the Scottish Executive (in early 2003) would take 
this stance when engaged in consultation – they would not discuss a smoking ban because 
they deemed it outside Scottish competence.  While the reserved element is based on a 
concordat rather than a specific reference to smoking in the Scotland Act, the scope for 
negotiation was also restricted in discussions with the civil service: ‘You couldn’t talk to 
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them about the specific issue.  It is a ‘ministerial decision’’ (interview, chief executive 
ASH Scotland 2004).  In other words, the framing of the smoking ban as a reserved area 
by the Scottish Executive was a classic example of non-decision making, by rejecting 
Scottish competence and therefore limiting discussion in meetings with groups. 
 
However, groups had a realistic alternative venue to pursue the issue in the Scottish 
Parliament.  MSPs and ASH Scotland set up a cross-party group on tobacco control (in 
2000) and part of its agenda was to tackle smoking in public places by framing it in terms 
of devolved competence: 
 
We can’t do health & safety in Scotland and so to get rid of smoking in the 
workplace we would need a Westminster bill.  But we can do it through public 
health and therefore legislate on closed public places (which are mainly 
workplaces) (interview, ASH Scotland 2004). 
 
The main output of this process was a members’ bill lodged by Stewart Maxwell MSP 
(Scottish National Party) in February 2004.  This was limited in scope, applying to 
premises where food (largely a devolved area) is served and consumed (SPICE, 2004a; 
SP Bill 20-PM 2004).  Maxwell was constrained by uncertainty over the extent to which 
public health measures could be extended and he was even careful to avoid mentioning 
workplaces in public to avoid a legal challenge.   
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The process which followed the introduction of the bill demonstrates two aspects of the 
distinctiveness of the Scottish process.  First, Maxwell was aided by the Non-Executive 
Bills Unit, designed to address the problem of MSP resources when drafting legislation.  
Second, the lack of MSP ability to consult widely with groups and affected interests is 
addressed by the committee process in the lead up to its stage 1 report. At this stage the 
lead committee takes responsibility for the development of the bill.  The Health 
committee received 323 written submissions and met 7 times to discuss the bill in 2004 
before delivering its report.  The report was supportive of the evidence on passive 
smoking and the principles of the bill and critical of the voluntary arrangements.  It 
concluded that if anything the ‘bill does not go far enough.’ (Scottish Parliament Health 
Committee, 2005). 
 
The Effect of Venue Shift 
 
In January 2004 the Scottish Executive First Minister rejected calls for legislation on this 
issue.  However, the result of pressure - from groups acting in two venues, a member’s 
bill making good progress in the Scottish Parliament, and a supportive committee process 
- was a reversal of this position.  This narrative is confirmed by Mike Rumbles MSP 
(Liberal Democrat): 
 
Stewart Maxwell’s bill deserves the credit.  The pressure from him made the 
difference.  While in June 2004 our policy committee made us the first party to 
formally adapt a no-smoking policy, when I led the Liberal Democrat team in 
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negotiations over the Partnership Agreement [in 2003], even none of us went that 
far. 
 
Maxwell’s bill would have made ‘great progress’ because of the scope for cross-party 
support and the lack of an effective opposition: 
 
This is the power of the committees and the Labour government is aware of this.  
Once you get the committee on board it is difficult to block it.  It is far more 
important to get it past committee discussions than, say, a full discussion at stage 
3.  The leisure industry and tobacco lobby didn’t realise the momentum building 
from the stage 1 committee review and the evidence the process gathered.  The 





When Maxwell’s bill was taken on by the Health committee a head of steam built up in 
Parliament around the unanimous public health message presented to it by groups during 
the evidence sessions.  The committee’s deliberations eventually produced a 
recommendation for a comprehensive ban.  Although the committee held back its report 
until January 2005 (two months after the Scottish Executive had decided to legislate), the 
shifting views of the committee members were known to Scottish ministers well in 
advance since they were expressed in meetings between the deputy health minister and 
Labour members (which were held directly before health committee meetings).   
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The Scottish Executive was therefore faced with the choice between supporting an 
opposition member’s bill, challenging vocal and relatively powerful public health 
interests in Scotland, or pursuing more ambitious legislation in an effort to ‘trump’ 
Maxwell’s bill.  The response following a public consultation was the latter: 
 
Legislative action is now required if we are to make any real progress in this area 
… Although there is much support for an approach that would create separate 
smoking or non smoking areas within leisure and hospitality premises, such an 
approach is difficult to justify on public health grounds given that there is no 
defined safe level of exposure to second hand smoke (Scottish Executive, 2004d).  
 
This statement marks a significant shift in policy since Jack McConnell previously 
argued that legislation would be ‘draconian, difficult to implement and unpopular’ 
(interview May 2005).  There is also evidence that Scottish ministers clung on to the idea 
of voluntary regulation during the consultation period: 
 
I went with McCabe [the deputy health minister] on panels around Scotland to 
have the debate and he hadn’t decided exactly which way to go – the 
strengthening of the voluntary agreement (perhaps with local authority input) was 
another option (interview ASH Scotland  2004).   
 
This equivocal approach is confirmed in A Breath of Fresh Air For Scotland (Scottish 
Executive 2004a: 25): 
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Clearly legislation is one option but, equally, an extension of the voluntary 
approach remains an option also. Much progress has been made in smoke-free 
environments in public places in Scotland through voluntary action … in our view 
statutory controls would only be truly effective – and ultimately enforceable – if 
they take place in an environment in which the legislation reflects rather than 




The Logical Progression Narrative: A Fluid Rather Than Fixed Position 
 
The logical progression narrative challenges the idea that legislation marked a significant 
policy shift.  It suggests that UK and Scottish positions on smoking were fluid rather than 
fixed and that a subtle reweighing of Scottish Executive priorities produced policy 
change which only appears to be a U-turn.  The voluntary agreement was a stepping 
stone towards smoking prohibition and recent legislation is part of a wider package of 
public health policies aimed at reducing tobacco consumption in Scotland.    
 
We can outline the first point by examining the susceptibility of decision maker 
preferences to changing policy images and the change in those images over time.  As 
Jones (1994: 5) argues, decision-makers have a multiplicity of preferences and so they 
‘value or weight preferences differently depending on the context in which they are 
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evoked’.   Jones and Baumgartner (2004) suggest that information is freely available but 
varies in reliability and weight: ‘a decision-maker explicitly forms an index out of 
numerous often noisy sources of information, and keys future choices to the value of the 
index’.  The reliability of sources and the weight attached to indicators changes over 
time, and the salience/ weight of the issues can change quickly.  This process can also be 
used as a resource by decision-makers who have attached different weights to their 
preferences in the light of new information.  In other words, stated preferences are subject 
to change if policy problems are framed in a different light, perhaps following successful 
advocacy, a changing public mood or new evidence (including the experiences of other 
countries).   Therefore with smoking policy it may not take much to cause what only 
appears to be a large shift in policy if the policy image of an issue or external 
consideration of that issue has changed. 
 
A gradual shift in attitudes towards tobacco is apparent over a long period.  As 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 90-2) discuss, in the US attitudes revolved around tobacco 
as a positive (a valuable export crop which attracted government subsidy) and as a 
negative (public health effects).  At the start of the 20
th
 century, tobacco attracted 
minimal media attention and most government attention was favourable.  Tobacco was an 
important industry and governments deferred to experts in agriculture.  Industry leaders 
benefited from a period of low attention to public health followed by a ‘true glorification 
of smoking immediately after the war’ (1993: 93). 
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Since the 1960s we have seen a shift of emphasis, including raised and negative media 
coverage reflecting the success of health professionals in mobilising opposition.  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 91) identify an exponential rise in the number of negative 
articles on tobacco from pre-1950 to the 1980s, as well as a similar drop in public 
consumption of tobacco over the period.  Crucially, this rise in negative attention to the 
issue leads to a reappraisal of the positive aspects.  In this case, the economic benefits are 
undermined by a focus on rising health insurance and decreasing worker productivity 
(1993: 114). If we look at the issue of tobacco from the post-war period in the UK we can 
see similar periods of reframing, including: 
 
1. Changing messages about the risks of smoking – studies in the 1950s reporting 
the relationship between smoking and lung cancer; publicity surrounding the 
Royal College of Physicians report, ‘Smoking and Health’, the first US Surgeon 
General report on ‘Smoking and Health’ in 1964, and the WHO report on ‘The 
limitation of smoking’ in 1970.   
2. Changing private sector responses to smoking – a general move towards 
increasing the provision for non-smoking in airlines, cinemas and public transport 
from the early 1970s. 
3. Progressive governmental responses – from the first voluntary agreement with the 
industry on advertising and health warnings on packs in 1971, to legislation in 
1991 addressing the sale of cigarettes to children (ASH, 2005). 
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In other words, UK government policy on smoking is fluid rather than fixed, with a long-
term trend towards smoking prohibition.  While we may identify periods of industry 
influence even in modern times (e.g. in the reliance on voluntary schemes), these are 
subject to continuous challenge from public health professionals and groups.  A more 
recent shift followed the election of a new party of government in 1997.  The Labour 
Government’s White Paper Smoking Kills (Cm 4177, 1998) represented a watershed in 
the debate. 
 
The Logical Progression of Scottish Policy 
 
This allows us to view the Scottish response in a different light – as an extension, 
rather than a contradiction, of a longer-term UK policy which was moving 
incrementally in a similar direction.  Scottish health ministers also challenge the idea 
of UK interference and ‘turf wars’ over competence.  Indeed, while John Reid was 
speaking out against a comprehensive ban in England, civil servants within the 
Department of Health were more supportive of Scotland’s efforts behind the scenes. 
The issue of devolved competence was a routine problem whose solution was only 
sought after the decision was taken to legislate in the light of new evidence.    
 
Recent moves to legislate marked a logical progression to the initial introduction of a 
voluntary scheme.  At the time of the its introduction in Scotland (2000), the view of 
Scottish Executive ministers was that a voluntary scheme was necessary to build up a 
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‘head of steam’ and create a sense within the tobacco and leisure industry that things 
would change in the future: 
 
We were very explicit that we had to go down the voluntary route first.  You 
couldn’t go from a standing start. There was a whole load of other things to 
consider and progress – the need for education, backing and a sense among those 
affected that a change was on the horizon. 
 
We can also see the legislation as a logical progression to: a wider public health agenda 
promoted by the Chief Medical Officer since 1999; the Scottish Executive’s equalities 
agenda
6
; and to wider smoking related initiatives such as providing nicotine patches on 
prescription and increasing smoking cessation services.  In various publications and 
public statements the Scottish Executive stressed the need to constantly assess its position 
as part of a broader public health strategy (see SPICE, 2004b).  For example, following 
Chief Medical Officer pressure, the profile of health improvement was raised within the 
Scottish Executive’s 2002 White Paper Partnership for Care.  This identified five factors 
at the root of health improvement – tobacco, alcohol, diet, exercise and drugs – and the 
CMO identified tobacco as the biggest of the five in the 2003 launch of his annual report. 
The Scottish Executive was committed to monitoring and evaluating the voluntary 
agreement and commissioned ASH Scotland and NHS Health Scotland to produce a 
report in October 2003.  It suggested that an evaluation would be combined with the 
pursuit of higher targets on smoke-free public places (Scottish Executive 2003: 32).  
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There is also a commitment to consult on increasing smoke-free restaurants and pubs in 
the 2003 Partnership Agreement (Scottish Labour & Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2003). 
 
The main driver towards legislation was the outcome of the monitoring process of the 
voluntary agreement.  ASH Scotland and NHS Health Scotland found that 7 out of 10 
pubs did not implement the voluntary arrangement and this prompted deputy health 
minister Tom McCabe to pursue the matter further within the Scottish Tobacco Control 
Strategy Group.  This process produced A Breath of Fresh Air For Scotland (Scottish 
Executive 2004a: 26) and McCabe announced a consultation on the back of the pressure 
surrounding the issue (which included the chief medical officer’s call for legislation at 
the public launch of his annual report).  Following this consultation the Scottish 
Executive found that the area was more conducive to policy change than it thought and 
acted accordingly.   
 
Developing a ‘Third Way’ Narrative 
It is inevitable that evidence from actors competing within political systems produce 
incomplete and often contradictory explanations for policy change.  The venue-shift 
narrative suggests that the scope for policy change in Scotland was limited by a 
combination of the UK government’s position, its relationship with the Scottish 
Executive and the Executive’s control of the Scottish Parliament.  The reframing of 
smoking policy in terms of public health rather than health and safety, combined with the 
improved agenda-setting ability of the Scottish Parliament caused a venue-shift and 
contributed to significant policy change.  However, this is undermined by the lack of 
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evidence of Whitehall control and the fluid nature of UK and Scottish ministerial 
positions on the issue.  While the reliance on voluntary agreements may suggest a level of 
tobacco-lobby influence, it is difficult to demonstrate that the move to legislate marked a 
reversal rather than an acceleration of Scottish Executive policy.   The logical-
progression narrative suggests that comprehensive legislation was consistent with earlier 
Scottish Executive strategies.  The voluntary approach marked a starting point for change 
and when the Scottish Executive confirmed its limitations, legislation was introduced to 
further the smoking agenda.  The voluntary approach was therefore consistent with the 
decision to legislate.  However, this narrative alone does not explain the timing of the 
decision to legislate, particularly since the inadequacy of the voluntary approach was 
related to ministers at least three years before the introduction of the Scottish Executive’s 
bill (interview, ASH Scotland, 2004).  It also struggles to explain the First Minister’s 
stated opposition to legislation as recently as January 2004 and the frustration of public 
health groups with the Scottish Executive’s lack of progress.  It is therefore necessary to 
supplement these narratives with more attention to the causal factors identified in both 
narratives - policy learning, media opinion, public opinion, and the role of parties. 
 
A degree of broad policy learning is apparent during the Scottish process with, for 
example, the Health Committee taking evidence from public health interests in New 
York.  However, the Irish experience in particular is relevant to Scotland for three 
reasons.  First, as Rose (1993) suggests, policy learning is fostered by ‘geographical 
propinquity’.  Scotland and Ireland already had close cultural and governmental ties, 
while similar populations and geography often makes policy learning between Ireland 
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and Scotland particularly relevant.  The lead up to the Scottish decision was marked by 
frequent delegations of ministers and MSPs to Ireland to see successful policy in action.  
Second, the Irish approach to tobacco policy was particularly relevant.  Until Ireland 
legislated the accepted model for change was incremental.  In California, New York and 
New Zealand bars were initially exempt from legislation but eventually isolated until 
public opinion shifted enough on the issue for a full ban.  The Irish model was wholesale, 
from relatively few restrictions to a complete ban on smoking in public places in a short 
space of time (a ‘50%’ policy announced in November 2002 was quickly replaced by 
‘100%’ measures in January 2003).  This was a model rarely pushed by pressure 
participants in the UK who felt incremental change and leaving bars to last was the more 
realistic option.  Incremental change was the model adopted by the Scottish Executive 
and it is clearly the approach favoured by Stewart Maxwell whose focus on food was 
based on a belief that a comprehensive ban on smoking in public places was possible but 
‘not in our lifetime’.  The Irish success therefore had a profound effect on Scottish 
Executive thinking and support for measures beyond Maxwell’s bill. 
 
Third, the Irish experience had a significant effect on the media coverage of Scottish 
policy.   Media opinion sympathetic to policy change was already apparent in 2003 in 
part because there was not an effective opposition to more prohibitive measures.  While 
in the past this may have been expected from tobacco companies, in 2003 the leisure and 
tobacco groups did not take the prospect of legislation seriously (even when giving 
evidence to the health committee on Maxwell’s bill).   Maxwell in particular reports a 
‘free run’ in the press from summer 2003 until 2004 and this agenda was strengthened by 
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widespread coverage of the success of policy in Ireland.  The Scottish Executive then 
used this coverage to good effect when Jack McConnell visited Ireland in August 2004.  
Building on the image of Irish success, the trip took on a Conversion of St Paul quality, 
in which the First Minister and key MSPs all had their views ‘reversed’ by the Irish 
experience.  However, it is just as likely that the trip was used to portray Scottish 
developments in a positive light, especially since Scottish-Irish contact took place on a 
regular basis before the trip and the evidence of implementation success was already 
apparent in Ireland and other countries.   
 
The effect of public opinion is less certain although most interviewees share the view that 
the scope for comprehensive change has come only recently.   Early Scottish debates on 
health were characterised by cross-party consensus on the need to address health 
improvement through public health measures, and the first Minister for Health Susan 
Deacon used this support to pursue measures on tobacco.  However, the suggestion in 
1999 (after a BBC straw poll) that 6 of the 11 members of the Health Committee were in 
favour of a smoking ban met with vehement opposition and media reports suggest that 
the Scottish Executive was forced to reassure the industry that this would not happen.
7
  
One of the committee’s MSPs also reports having ‘my knuckles rapped in my 
constituency’.   The perception of constraint was still apparent in the lead up to the 2003 
elections, with tobacco receiving no discussion in the Scottish Labour manifesto, a vague 
commitment from the SNP to consult on smoking in public places and a Liberal 
Democrat commitment to consult on the prospect of a ban phased in over ten years (the 
Conservatives opposed further prohibitive measures).  
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In late 2003 the limited nature of Maxwell’s bill partly reflected the perception that 
public opinion was not conducive to comprehensive legislation.  Even the Chief Medical 
Officer (credited with much of the shift in Jack McConnell’s thinking) met with 
significant public resistance in 2003 when publicising the issue during the launch of his 
annual report.  The Scottish Executive only felt able to pursue a comprehensive line on 
smoking prohibition in 2004 when it sensed a shifting public mood towards the issue: 
‘The fact that we can now have the debate marks just how much public opinion has 
changed’ (interview, former deputy health minister, 2005).   
 
However, the evidence also suggests that comprehensive legislation went beyond the 
levels of public opinion expressed in 2004. This is demonstrated well by the decision of 
the UK government to propose a partial ban on smoking in public places on the basis of 
similar survey evidence.  The UK’s White Paper in 2004, suggests that the 
‘majority tend to be opposed to a complete ban’ (Cm 6374, 2004).  It draws on Office of 
National Statistics surveys which suggest that although support for restrictions on 
smoking in pubs rose from 48% in 1996 to 56% in 2003, only 20% (of the 56%) 
supported an all-out ban.  Curtice (2006: 57) suggests that Scottish attitudes were not 
significantly different, with only 25% opting for a complete ban in pubs (in 2004).  
Therefore, the legislation should be characterised as an attempt by ‘Scotland’s political 
elite to change the attitudes and behaviour of people in Scotland’ (2006: 57).  While more 
recent survey results suggest that this strategy has worked, a more short-term problem 
was constructing enough legitimacy for comprehensive legislation.  This was achieved 
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through one of the largest consultations conducted by the Scottish Executive (2004b).  It 
distributed 600,000 copies in June 2004 and received over 53,000 responses by October.  
The report on the responses suggested that 80% supported a law to make enclosed public 
places smoke-free and 56% felt that there should not be any exemptions (Scottish 
Executive 2004c). The Scottish Executive used the consultation results to justify 
introducing a comprehensive ban on smoking in public places (Scottish Executive, 
2004d).  The consultation became a key resource for pursuing comprehensive legislation 
since it gave the Scottish Executive ‘the moral authority and we couldn’t act otherwise’ 
(interview, Irene Oldfather MSP, 2005). 
 
The final factor is the role of parties.   In the first Scottish Parliamentary session (1999-
2003) there was potential for the SNP (holding 35 of 129 seats) and Conservatives (18) to 
exploit Labour (56) and Liberal Democrat (17) coalition divisions on ‘flagship’ policies.  
In particular, the introduction of free personal care was ensured by the Liberal Democrats 
threatening to use the strength of opposition and vote against Labour (see Simeon, 2003: 
230). In the case of smoking, while the Liberal Democrats were committed to smoking 
prohibition, the fact that the Conservatives were likely to oppose the bill on principle 
meant that it would not progress past stage 1 without Labour support.  The scope for 
Scottish Executive control of the issue was therefore more significant and at the time 
there was potential to follow England in the pursuit of partial measures.  However, this is 
not to say that the role of parties was insignificant.  The popularity of an SNP bill on 
smoking was not only a driver for relatively quick Scottish Executive action (with 
Scottish ministers openly praising Maxwell’s earlier work), but also persuaded 
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McConnell that there was enough cross-party support to make this a non-issue in the lead 
up to the 2005 UK general election. 
 
Policy Windows 
In this context, we may view factors such as the Ireland experience, media and public 
opinion, group influence and Scottish Parliament activity as a spur for change but also a 
resource for Scottish ministers looking to initiate a potentially unpopular policy.   There 
is little evidence to suggest that the strength of media or public opinion forced policy 
change, since incremental and partial shifts in policy would still be in line with public 
attitudes to a complete ban.  Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest ‘indirect 
coercive’ policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) since the Scottish Executive 
fostered Irish comparisons and had the established experience of incremental policy 
change in other countries  to draw on when considering a more limited policy response.  
Rather, these factors opened up a ‘policy window’ for change.  As Kingdon (1984: 165-
6) suggests, political change also requires a set of circumstances to come together at the 
right time: 
 
Separate streams come together at critical times.  A problem is recognized, a 
solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change 
makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe … 
these policy windows, the opportunities for action on given initiatives, present 
themselves and stay open for only short periods. 
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The positive reception to Stewart Maxwell’s bill combined with the Ireland experience 
and public health support made it difficult for the Scottish Executive to oppose the bill 
without providing an alternative.  The support for legislation in progress undermined the 
ability of the Scottish Executive to put off legislative change until after the UK general 
election in 2005 or until the UK government ‘caught up’ and legislated for the UK as a 
whole (interview, Stewart Maxwell MSP, 2005).  However, there was also clear political 
will to legislate.  The then Deputy Health Minister Tom McCabe was not only personally 
committed to policy change, but also saw the opportunity to do so when witnessing the 
momentum building up in the health committee and the effect of the Irish experience on 
media and public opinion.  Similarly, Maxwell was aware of the limitations of his bill as 
well as his chances of direct success.  As a result, both agreed to pursue the issue in 
tandem.  Ministers agreed to acknowledge Maxwell’s contribution to the debate and 
Maxwell agreed to refrain from criticising the position of ministers, since he became 
aware (four months in advance of the consultation process) that they were in the process 
of changing it.   
 
In this case the desire of ministers to avoid political embarrassment following policy 
divergence was outweighed by the desire of ministers to ‘make their mark’ and point to 
divergence as a justification for devolution.  Smoking came at a good time for a First 
Minister tainted by the Holyrood building project and accused of presiding over an 
‘administration’ rather than an Executive.  Legislation was the opportunity to give the 
Scottish Parliament direction and provide the ‘Big Idea’ that Jack McConnell was 
looking for.  Public health with smoking at the centre was to be ‘Jack McConnell’s free 
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personal care’.   Finally, a crucial factor was the lack of costs, not only in terms of 
political popularity but also resources invested in current policy.  Theories based on path 
dependence suggest that when commitment to a policy has been established and 
resources devoted to it, over time it becomes increasingly or relatively costly to choose a 
different policy.  In the case of smoking, few Scottish Executive resources were invested 
in existing policy and any ‘sunk costs’ (such as the investment in ventilation as part of the 
voluntary charter) would be met by the private sector. 
 
Conclusion: Can We Generalise from a Case Study? 
In many ways the case study of smoking is atypical.  First, the evidence from most policy 
areas with blurred boundaries is that they are dealt with by referring the issue back to 
Westminster.  The competition to reframe the issue is not routine (Cairney and Keating, 
2004).  Second, the level of Scottish influence on UK policy is also unusual since the 
evidence from public service efficiency, health policy, housing stock transfer and tuition 
fees suggests that pressure towards policy transfer tends to come from England (Cairney, 
2006c).  Third, the level of Scottish parliamentary attention on one issue was unusual and 
suggests less attention and influence over the remainder of governmental activity.  
Fourth, the level of medical influence marks Scotland out from the rest of the UK and 
marks out health (and perhaps education) policy from the remainder of the devolution 
settlement.  Finally, the decision to shift policy was based on the assumption of minimal 
cost.  The scope for change is less apparent in policies which involve distribution rather 
than regulation (Mitchell, 2004).  
 
 29 
However, while the general significance of venue shift may be less than it first appears, 
the potential to reframe policy issues and therefore reframe the devolution settlement 
itself is one of the most significant developments of devolution.  The case study also has 
implications for the comparative study of policy.   There may be a temptation to view the 
UK policy experience as a whole and to view tobacco policy change as an almost 
inevitable development of global policy shifts based on shifting public attitudes.  Yet, the 
case study shows not only the significance of Scottish policy change within the UK, but 
also the relative unpredictability of policy and the requirement of a number of policy 
conditions for significant change to take place.  This ‘micro-political’ explanation is often 
lost in broader comparative studies. 
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